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RECENT DECISIONS
Patents - Licensing Agreements - Estoppel To
Deny Validity
Early in 1953 the defendant aircraft manufacturer hired the plaintiff
to develop a technique for producing accurate but relatively inexpensive
gyroscopes for use in high speed airplanes. Plaintiff retained the rights to
his ideas but agreed to a licensing agreement with the defendant. Within
a year after his employment, plaintiff had developed a satisfactory tech-
nique which, in order to protect his interest in his invention, he sought to
patent. At the same time plaintiff and defendant entered into an extensive
licensing agreement giving defendant the right to terminate in certain
designated circumstances. These included the refusal of the patent office
to issue a patent or a subsequent holding of invalidity. Processing of the
application, entailing several amendments, stretched out over the next six
years, plaintiff not receiving his patent until 1960. In the interim, de-
fendant had successfully used the technique developed by plaintiff at its
California plant and had adopted a similar procedure in its more extensive
Michigan operations.1 Plaintiff received royalties on all production at
both plants until 1957, in the case of the Michigan production, and 1959,
in the case of the California-produced gyroscopes, when the defendant
announced that it would stop payment of royalties since an existing patent
had anticipated plaintiff's ideas. Immediately after receipt of his patent in
1960, plaintiff brought suit in the California Superior Court alleging breach
of the 1955 licensing contract. Defendant sought to raise patent invalidity
as a defense, but the trial court directed a verdict for plaintiff on the
gyroscopes produced in the California plant. Defendant's contract with
the plaintiff estopped it from questioning the validity of the patent. How-
ever, the court granted defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict as to the production in Michigan, ruling that defendant had
developed the Michigan technique independently of plaintiff's ideas. On
appeal by both sides to the California Court of Appeals, the court reversed
the judgment holding that the 1955 contract permitted defendant to
terminate its royalty obligations and that plaintiff could only recover for
a subsequent infringement. The California Supreme Court, however, re-
turned to the estoppel view adopted by the trial court, but refused to
accept the lower court's view of the Michigan gyroscopes; thus it reinstated
the jury's award in its entirety. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider the federal question. Held, vacated and remanded:
A patent licensee cannot be estopped from raising the invalidity of the
' Defendant contended that the technique employed in Michigan was developed indcpendently
and, therefore, could not be considered subject to the 19SS agreement.
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patent on which the licensor relies to claim royalties. Earlier cases creating
the estoppel doctrine are overruled. Since a patent is nothing more than an
administratively determined legal conclusion, it is not unfair to require
the patentee to defend his monopoly when its validity is placed in issue.
The licensee also should not be obliged to pay royalties during the time
when he is questioning the patent's validity, since to require him to do so
would frustrate strong federal policies of speedy adjudication and the full
and free use of ideas in the public domain. Lear, Incorporated v. Adkins,
395 U.S. 653 (1969).
The instant case, it must be noted, is a suit in contract and not one for
patent infringement. Plaintiff sought to recover what the defendant
allegedly had agreed to pay him rather than attempting to carry the heavy
burden of proving patent validity and the measure of damages, both of
which are necessary elements of the infringement suit. With the aid of
the estoppel doctrine, which would prevent any controversy over patent
validity, plaintiff would only be required to show (1) the contract, in
which defendant had promised to pay royalties, in effect, until the patent
was declared invalid, and (2) the amount owing to him calculated on the
basis of the defendant's production. Defendant would thus be required
to commence an expensive and lengthy action of its own to show patent
invalidity. The effect of the estoppel doctrine, then, was to shift the bur-
den of proof to the licensee paying on a presumptively valid patent.!
Because the useful life of the patent might be considerably less than the
probable duration of a court battle over its validity, a more serious prac-
tical effect was to require the licensee to pay whether it legally had to or
not.
The Court indicated at the outset that "the only issue open to us is
raised by the [California Supreme Court's] reliance upon the doctrine of
estoppel to bar [defendant] from proving that [plaintiff's] ideas were
dedicated to the common welfare by federal law."' Thus the estoppel issue
itself was the keystone to the entire controversy. The majority opinion,
therefore, developed the history of the doctrine at some length, reviewing
its origins and exploring its actual scope. The "general rule," relied on by
the California Supreme Court, was found to be so eroded by exceptions
that the existence of a discreet rule of law was doubtful." With this sup-
posed uncertainty as a predicate, then, the Court felt itself free to examine
the merits of the estoppel policy.
The majority, in considering the basis of the doctrine, first noted the
balancing problems which faced the judiciary.
On the one hand, the law of contracts forbids a purchaser to repudiate his
promises simply because he later becomes dissatisfied with the bargain he has
2 This, of course, would depend on the jurisdiction. If showing patent invalidity were con-
sidered to be a defense on which the defendant had the burden of proof, then, the result would be
the same in either case. But, if the defendant need only raise the issue so that the plaintiff was
required to prove patent validity, the burden would be shifted by denying the defendant the right
to raise the matter at the outset.
a 395 U.S. at 662.
4 id. at 661-68, for the Court's extensive discussion of this convoluted area.
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made. On the other hand, federal law requires that all ideas in general circula-
tion be dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a valid
patent.'
But the attempt to develop an intermediate position "has been a failure."'
Any new attempt must be founded on a consideration of the validity of
the countervailing arguments.
A patent, the Court noted, is merely a "legal conclusion reached by the
Patent Office' 7 in an ex parte proceeding which partakes more of a legis-
lative than an adjudicative-and thus adversary-determination. The
majority found it logical and equitable that the patentee be required to
defend this legal conclusion, which is presumptively correct, when it is
attacked by a licensee. Though the letter of contract law demands an
estoppel on the licensee, the spirit of the law, "which seeks to balance
the claims of promisor and promisee in accord with the requirements of
good faith,"' does not. Perhaps the strongest argument the Court brought
to bear on the problems was that
[I]icensees may often be the only individuals with enough economic incentive
to challenge the patentability of an inventor's discovery. If they are muzzled,
the public may continually be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists
without need or justification. We think it plain that the technical require-
ments of contract doctrine must give way before the demands of the public
interest in the typical situation involving the negotiation of a license after
a patent has issued.'
Although the instant case presented a somewhat less appealing one for
the licensee than the Court might have liked-since the defendant had
access to and use of plaintiff's ideas throughout the lengthy period before
the patent was issued-the majority nonetheless felt compelled to over-
rule the California Supreme Court's decision. The difficulty which the
Court encountered was not so much the estoppel doctrine as the problem
of whether the licensee here could be forced to pay royalties under its
contract on an unpatented but secret idea. The plaintiff insisted that the
contract be enforced regardless of the subsequent validity of the patent.
But the Court found that the 1955 licensing contract
is no more controlling on this issue than is the State's doctrine of estoppel,
which is also rooted in contract principles. The decisive question is whether
overriding federal policies would be significantly frustrated if licensees could
be required to continue to pay royalties during the time they are challenging
patent validity in the courts.10
Therefore, the licensee should not be required to pay post-1960 royalties
if it can prove patent invalidity, since to do so would be inconsistent with
federal patent policy. The problem of pre-1960 payments was sidestepped,







9 d. at 670-71.
0 d. at 673.
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admonition that state courts "reconsider the theoretical basis of their de-
cisions enforcing the contractual rights of inventors."'"
The Court's decision on the estoppel question is hardly surprising. Al-
though it might be argued that one who receives the benefit of a thing
should not be able to attack the underlying source of that benefit, this
argument does not seem to bear up in the patent licensee case. If, in fact,
the idea is part of the public domain, the licensee should have free access
to it, just as would one who had not contracted with the patentee. But
if the idea is new and thus unique, the licensee will be obliged to pay for
its use in any event. To disable him from questioning the uniqueness of
the idea is to abridge a concept which has become basic to the American
economic scheme of things, the anti-monopolistic free enterprise system.
Because the patent is-since the turn of the century at least-an exception
to this policy, it apparently must be required to carry a heavy burden of
self-justification.
B.L.A.
Terminal Accident - Stairway Condition
Constructive Notice
This was an action for personal injury arising out of a fall on an interior
stairway at an Israeli airport. The plaintiff was a member of a tour
arranged by one of the defendants, Unitours, a domestic travel agency.
Passage was provided by the co-defendant, El Al Airlines, a foreign air
carrier, which had leased space in the terminal. At the time of the accident
plaintiff was unaccompanied by any agent or servant for either defendant.
While awaiting his delayed flight, he was invited by the defendant airline
to have a complimentary breakfast on the mezzanine level of the govern-
ment-owned terminal. The plaintiff ascended to the upper level by an
interior stairway that was neither part of the area leased by, nor under
the control of, the defendant airline. Twenty minutes later plaintiff slipped
on an unidentified foreign substance while descending the same stairway.
In a pretrial examination the plaintiff testified that he failed to notice any
hazardous condition when ascending the stairway. Held: An airline which
leases space in a terminal or a travel agency which organizes a tour in
conjunction with such an airline does not have constructive notice of all
hazardous conditions in the terminal. Warsbavesky v. El Al Airlines and
Unitours, Inc., 161 N.Y.L.J. 57-2 (N.Y. Sup. 1969).
11 Id. at 675. Mr. Justice White wrote a separate opinion in which he concurred with the ma-
jority in part. Basically his objection is that the question of collection of royalties due under a
contract rooted in state law was not properly before the Court and thus should not have been
decided. Mr. Justice Black wrote a third opinion, joined in by The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Douglas, in which he dissented from the Court's disposition of the question of state enforcement
of the contract between the parties. By reserving judgment on this issue, the Court ignores a basic
element of federal patent law, to wit, that a state may not enforce a monopolistic use of an idea
unless a valid patent has been issued.
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Before the New York Supreme Court for New York County the de-
fendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the personal injury
negligence actions against them. The motion was granted on the basis of
the pretrial examinations and documents submitted as evidence which re-
vealed insufficiency of proof. The plaintiff failed to establish that either
defendant had caused the stairway condition or had actual notice of such
condition, for his own testimony established that the alleged dangerous
condition had existed less than twenty minutes in an area of the terminal
not under the airlines control. Thus, the court reasoned there was no
triable issue regarding constructive notice to the defendants. Moreover,
the plaintiff's charge that some unspecified conduct by the airline was
responsible for the dangerous condition was held to be not a triable issue
without the complaint alleging a cause. Since Unitours acted only as a
servant to plaintiff and not a guarantor of his safety while on the foreign
tour, the court reasoned that it was not required to constantly accompany
its tour members.
J.L.C.
Conflict of Laws - Maritime Tort - Significant
Contracts Doctrine
On 16 August 1965 a United Air Lines jet crashed in Illinois territorial
waters killing everyone on board. Representatives of several decedents
brought separate wrongful death actions against United in the Supreme
Court of New York County. Although the court recognized that the
actions were maritime in nature, it held that the New York wrongful
death statute-the law of the forum-was applicable. Subsequently the
four cases were appealed to the Appellate Division and considered together
because of the common questions of law and fact. There the court reversed
the lower court's decision and held that the plaintiff's actions were "con-
trolled by principles of maritime law,"' not the law of the forum; thus
the state wherein the accident occurred, Illinois, had "sovereignty over
deaths caused by [these] maritime torts."' Since the Illinois wrongful
death statute limited recovery to $30,000, the plaintiffs' appealed the
question of damages to the New York Court of Appeals. Held, reversed:
Although the crash of a plane in state territorial waters is a maritime tort,
"the court is not precluded from determining which of the competing
wrongful death statutes should regulate particular actions"' arising out
of the accident. Therefore, in actions arising out of a maritime tort, the
wrongful death statute of that state having the most significant contacts
111 Av. Cas. 17,121 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3220 (U.S. Dec. 15,
1969).
Id. See Comment, Aviation Challenges Admiralty Jurisdiction: Sink Or Swim In The Sea Of
Uncertainty, 35 J. AIR L. & CoM. 629 (1969).
3 11 Av. Cas. at 17,123.
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with the parties and the issues involved may be applied instead of the
wrongful death statute of the state in whose territorial waters the tort
occurred. Thomas v. United Air Lines, 11 Av. Cas. 17, 121 (May 28,
1969).
Even though the court reasoned that the "locality test" is not the only
one for establishing admiralty jurisdiction over actions arising from torts
committed in state navigable waters, it rendered its decision based on the
dictum in Scott v. Eastern Air Lines." In Scott the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held that, while the action was a maritime tort within
the meaning of Weinstein v. Eastern Air Lines' ("locality test"), maritime
law does not require the indiscriminate application of the law of the state
where the tort took place. It looked to the Supreme Court's decision in
Lauritzen v. Larsen' as providing proper guidance for the applicable law.
In applying the law of Pennsylvania over the law of Massachusetts, situs
of the maritime tort, the appellate court held:
Admiralty courts, like state courts, have an obligation to refrain from apply-
ing a rule when it's application would be inappropriate, if not inequitable,
to apply the law of Massachusetts to this case simply because Eastern's air-
craft happened to crash into that state's navigable waters.!
The court's decision in the instant case is not surprising in light of the
strong persuasion and thorough analysis presented by the court in Scott.
However, the question will not be settled until more decisions are handed
down in other circuits or by the Supreme Court.
W.A.S.
4 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 979 (1968). See Note, Conflict of Law-Mari-
time Tort-Significant Contact Theory, 34 J. Am L. & CoM. 651, 655-59 (1968); Comment, 35
J. AiR L. & CoM. at 631.
5 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963). See Note, 34 J. Am L. & COM.
at 653-54; Comment, 35 J. AIR L. & CoM. at 621.
0345 U.S. 571 (1953). See Note, 34 J. AIR L. & CoM. at 658-59; Comment, 35 J. Am L.
& CoM. at 630-31.
7 316 F.2d at 28-29.
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